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Abstract-Cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) of policies intended to increase occupant restraint in automobiles 
typically find that such policies generate social benefits that exceed social costs, often by a considerable 
margin. The analyses are incomplete, however, due to their inability to incorporate potentially important 
costs and benefits that are hard to measure and monetize. Furthermore, analyses fail to account for 
distributional and political considerations. Despite these limitations, the evidence produced by the occupant 
restraint CBAs tends to bolster the case of advocates of mandatory passive restraints and other restraint 
policies. Support for governmental involvement can also be found in economic theory, although the 
theoretical case is not necessarily compelling. The principal lesson of this review of economic analysis 
of the occupant restraint issue is that analysis can inform an injury policy debate, but it cannot provide 
conclusive answers, nor can it serve as a substitute for the political decision-making process. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the economic perspective on injury in the context of a case study 
of injury and public sector intervention to reduce it. The injury case is the death and 
disability resulting from motor vehicle accidents, the source of half of all unintentional 
injury fatalities [Smith, 19841. The public sector intervention is the federal government’s 
attempts to provide car passengers with effective occupant restraint. These attempts relate 
to both active and passive restraint systems, respectively the seatbelts currently found in 
virtually all automobiles, and passive belts and aiibags. The intent of this paper is two- 
fold: (1) to determine how economic analysis has been applied to elucidate the occupant 
restraint issue, considering the technical merits of such analysis and the policy implications 
and impact; and (2) to re-examine the economic theory rationale for governmental in- 
tervention in the concrete instance of a major injury policy debate. 
BACKGROUND 
Motor vehicle accidents (MVAs) are the nation’s leading source of injury-related 
death and disability. Each year, MVAs will kill from 40,000 to 50,000 Americans and 
inflict injuries on an additional 4 to 5 million. The distribution of this burden is of particular 
concern, since motor vehicle injury victims are disproportionately the young. The motor 
vehicle death rate for persons 15-24 years old is twice the national average; the median 
age of MVA fatalities is 27 years. As a result, the number of life-years lost prior to age 
65-some 1.7 million per year-is roughly comparable to the number of “preretirement” 
years lost due to malignant neoplasms, which account for eight times as many deaths 
[Robertson, 19831. The tragedy of MVA injuries is compounded by recognition that motor 
vehicle accidents are the principal source of severe and permanent disabilities among 
young people. 
The sheer magnitude of the mortality and disability toll of MVAs qualifies them as 
a significant public health problem. But the fact that has thrust them into the public policy 
arena is the avoidability of so much of the death and disability. Modifications of vehicles, 
highways and driver behavior each could reduce the toll substantially. A prominent case 
in point, widespread use of occupant restraint systems, could reduce the MVA death and 
disability toll by an estimated 25-50 percent, the range reflecting varying assumptions 
about the technical effectiveness of restraint systems, their use by the driving public, 
compensatory risk-taking behavior [Wilde, 19821, and so on. 
Effective occupant restraint could be achieved through two mechanisms, one relating 
to a change in occupant behavior, the other to modification of the vehicle. The latter 
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entails installation of passive restraints-passive belts and air bags.* The former involves 
getting people to use the seat belts available in virtually all cars. The problem is the low 
rate of voluntary seatbelt usage, generally observed to be in the range of lo-15 percent 
through the early 1980s with the resultant gap between the potential and realized injury 
avoidance associated with occupant restraint systems. Absent the pervasive disregard for 
belts, the gap would be much smaller. While there might still be potential for additional 
avoidance of injuries, it is most unlikely that the clamor for passive restraint and man- 
datory belt use legislation would approach its current intensity. 
Public policy concern with occupant restraint covers more than two decades. Front- 
seat lap belts were first installed as standard equipment in cars in 1964, when 14 states 
required them. By the late 1960s lap and shoulder belts were required as standard 
equipment in all new cars sold in the U.S. In 1969, the National Highway Safety Bureau 
(the predecessor to today’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA) 
proposed the first in a long series of rulemakings requiring passive restraints in auto- 
mobiles. The intervening 17 years are best characterized as a period of debate on the 
wisdom of such a policy, punctuated by a series of federal rulemakings requiring passive 
restraints, each (to date) followed by repeated implementation delays or rescissions. The 
current operative policy dates from July 1984, when the Department of Transportation 
reinstated the passive restraint rule, requiring that all new cars sold in the U.S. have 
passive restraints by 1990. This ruling included the proviso that passive restraints will not 
be required if states covering two-thirds of the U.S. population pass mandatory belt use 
laws. As of June 1986,28 states had adopted such laws. 
With occupant restraint so long at the forefront of MVA policy consideration, it is 
not surprising that the issue has attracted the attention of policy-minded economists. The 
majority of economic analyses have taken the form of cost-benefit analyses (CBAs), 
studies addressing the question of whether the individual and social benefits of belt use 
(or mandatory passive restraints) outweigh the costs. While CBA has been in use for 
many years [Warner and Lute, 19821, the technique is in its ascendancy as a tool of policy 
analysis, particularly with regard to governmental regulation, and this undoubtedly prompted 
some of the CBAs in this area, especially in recent years. But application of CBA to 
restraint issues is also a natural analytical response to two features of the contemporary 
reality of restraint use, each of which contradicts the intuitive appeal of restraints: (1) 
the majority of drivers behave as if the costs of seatbelt usage exceed the benefits (i.e. 
they choose not to buckle up), despite the fact that the cost of a severe MVA injury 
would be enormous and buckling up is so simple; and (2) the principal arguments levied 
against the passive restraint rule, primarily by the automobile manufacturers, are that 
one technology-the air bag-would be too expensive, while the other-the passive 
belt-would not be utilized with sufficient frequency to justify its smaller incremental 
cost (i.e. occupants would disconnect their passive belts, thereby converting them into 
active nonrestraints). Each of these points leads to a natural inclination to study the facts 
of restraint costs and benefits. 
In the context of the social policy debate on occupant restraint, the existence of the 
CBAs is quite appropriate. Less self-evident is the validity and usefulness of the CBAs 
and, more fundamentally, the appropriateness of the fact and nature of governmental 
involvement in the occupant restraint issue. With regard to the validity of the CBAs, one 
must examine the strengths and weaknesses of this analytical technique as it has been 
applied in this case study of injury prevention. The usefulness of the CBAs depends both 
on the studies’ technical merits and on the political environment in which restraint policy 
decision making occurs. From an economist’s perspective the appropriateness of govern- 
mental involvement in the restraint issue centers around basic principles of economic 
theory and their application in this instance. 
The next section of this paper presents a brief discussion of the literature on CBAs 
on occupant restraint, identifying themes and then focusing on CBAs that have received 
*Research is also underway to develop cars with more “forgiving” interiors and exteriors that would 
automatically protect occupants in serious crashes, independent of restraint use. We do not consider this 
approach to occupant safety in the present paper. 
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considerable attention in the course of the government’s recent deliberations on a passive 
restraint rule. * In the following section, the strengths and weaknesses of studies are 
considered and their policy usefulness evaluated in the context of these technical aspects, 
as well as the context of the environment of restraint policymaking. The next two sections 
of the paper explore the broader issue of the appropriateness, and appropriate nature, 
of governmental involvement in this area of automotive safety. These two foci-a look 
at the substance and usefulness of occupant restraint CBAs and consideration of the 
theoretical basis of governmental inte~ention from the perspective of economics-lead 
to some concluding comments relating to the role of economic analysis in identifying and 
addressing major injury policy problems. 
CBAS OF MOTOR VEHICLE OCCUPANT RESTRAINT SYSTEMS** 
CBAs pertaining to the restraint issue date back a decade and a half. In 1970, Lave 
and Weber examined the costs and benefits of seatbelts from the perspective of the 
individual and found that benefits exceeded costs if the value of an individual’s life was 
at least $10,000, a number more than a full order of magnitude below the smallest estimates 
of the value of life (or livelihood). Lave and Weber failed to explain why, however, with 
benefits so much larger than costs, the majority of riders chose not to wear belts. Thaler 
and Rosen 119751 addressed this question in an analysis in which they compared the time 
costs of buckling up with the expected benefit. They estimated an annual benefit from 
wearing lap belts of approximately $10 (using a value of life of $2~,0~) and argued that 
the individuaI’s opportunity cost of time involved in buckling and unbuckling the seatbelt 
could easily exceed this amount. 
Analyses of a passive restraint rule followed shortly after the early examination of 
the economic merits of seatbelt use. These analyses fed directly into the policy debate 
on the wisdom of requiring passive restraints in all cars. In 1974, NHTSA released a 
CBA that demonstrated “the superiority of passive restraint systems compared to belt 
systems presently required.” Two years later, another CBA accompanied the announce- 
ment of a public hearing to be held by the Department of Transportation (DOT) [In- 
surance Institute for Highway Safety, 1978). At about the same time, Robertson 119771 
directed a survey which, though not itself a CBA, produced a finding of direct relevance 
to CBA: a sample of new-car buyers expressed a willingness to pay an average of $12 
more per month ($144 per year) in car payments to save 6000 lives per year, and $17 per 
month ($204 per year) to save 12,000 lives. According to these figures, it appears that 
many new-car buyers might stand prepared to pay considerably more than the amount 
passive-belt systems would require. Of course, whether answers to a hypothetical question 
would translate into equivalent action in the marketplace remains to be seen. 
Despite studies such as these, implementation of a passive restraint rule did not 
occur. Delays and rescission of the proposed rule (known as Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard, or FMVSS, 208) became particularly politicized during the Carter and Reagan 
administrations. In 1981, two CBAs gained considerable attention as they were developed 
by highly regarded economists and fed into the policy debate. In one study, authors 
Arnould and Grabowski analyzed the economics of the lap/shoulder belt from the per- 
spective of the individual and, separately, passive-restraint systems from the point of view 
of society as a whole. In the first of these, Arnould and Grabowski worked with three 
different weighting schemes to value individuals’ willingness to pay to avoid injuries of 
varying severity. The authors concluded that the expected annual benefits from regular 
belt use, $38 to $78 (in 1975 dollars), had to exceed the time opportunity costs associated 
with buckling up. Subject to two qualifications, which they dismissed as insufficent to 
*It is assumed that the reader is familiar with both the basic principles of cost-benefit analysis and the 
rudimentary facts pertaining to occupant restraint systems. The reader who is not acquainted with CBA should 
consult Warner and Lute [1982], Mishan [1976], or any other introduction to the analytical technique. For 
background information on restraint issues, see Warner [1983]. 
**Material in this and the succeeding section reproduces or draws heavily from text in a previously published 
article by the author [Warner, 19831. 
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reverse their conch&on, they argued that belt nonuse is not the result of rational, informed 
decision-making, as Thaler and Rosen has suggested it to be. On the contrary, Arnould 
and Grabowski interpreted their findings as supporting the “insensitivity-to-iow-proba- 
bilities” hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that for very low-probability events, such 
as a serious car crash on a single outing, individuals become insensitive to the high potential 
cost of not protecting themselves, and indeed may not comprehend the meaning of the 
tiny probability; instead, they respond to the unlikelihood of the event. Furthermore, 
Arnould and Grabowski presented evidence that people significantly underestimate their 
risk of involvement in an automobile accident. (See, also, Kunreuther, 1985.) 
While Arnould and Grabowski’s evidence and logic are persuasive, they are not 
entirely convincing. One can argue, for example, that the authors dismissed too readily 
the possibility that people value freedom from the discomfort (physical or psychological) 
produced by belts at more than the expected benefits. Given hundreds of hours of driving 
per year, the hourly discomfort cost would have to be extraordinarily low for this factor 
not to play a role. 
Arnould and Grabowski’s second CBA, on mandatory passive restraints, concluded 
that a system of either automatic belts or air bags would produce substantial social benefits, 
with the benefits of airbags slightly exceeding those of automatic belts. The cost of the 
bags is so much higher than that of the belts, however, that belts appeared to be superior 
on the basis of net benefit (or benefit-cost ratio). Indeed, the authors found that only 
under very favorable conditions would airbags result in positive net benefits; in other 
words, the costs of bags quite likely would exceed the benefits. Again, however, Arnould 
and Grabowski ignored discomfort costs, which apply only to belts. 
Arnould and Grabowski’s study is notewo~hy for its sensitivity analysis, which tests 
the impact of varying assumptions on the benefit-cost conclusions. The analysis is thor- 
ough in its consideration of economic costs and benefits, but it merely mentions the costs 
of inconvenience and discomfort associated with belts, costs which must be considered 
potentially large given all of the evidence on belt use; and, like almost all CBAs, the 
analysis ignores the costs of the suffering experienced by the loved ones of automobile 
accident victims. Subject to these limitations, the authors estimated that, in a steady- 
state situation (i.e. after passive restraints were in virtually all automobiles, commonly 
estimated to require about ten years), net benefits of passive belts could be as high as 
$8.5 billion, and would not be likely to be less than $3.4 billion, the range reflecting 
varying assumptions about rates of disconnecting passive belts and the like. Net benefits 
of air bags, by contrast, could reach $6.6 billion, but could also be as low as -$4.9 
billion, the cost of bags being a significant variable. The authors also calculated expected 
annual costs per life saved, which ranged from $135,000 to $557,000 for belts, and from 
$472,000 to $2,159,000 for bags. These cost figures attribute no value to injuries avoided. 
Another CBA was undertaken precisely to feed into DOT’s reconsideration of FMVSS 
208. Sponsored by five major automobile insurance companies, Nordhaus [ 19811 examined 
and compared the two passive-restraint systems, although he focused his analysis on 
passive belts, the system generally expected to dominate if FMVSS 208 were to go into 
effect. The analytical slant taken by Nordhaus was somewhat different from that of 
Arnould and Grabowski, since he concentrated on the (net) cost of delaying or reordering 
impIementation of Rule 208, rather than making the “either-or” comparison of the status 
quo with a fully implemented passive-restraint rule. Of course, as one of DOT’s options 
was to rescind Rule 208 altogether, Nordhaus’s analysis of the net cost of this option is 
directly comparable to other analyses of the net benefit of fully implementing a passive- 
restraint rule. (See, also, Nordhaus, 1984.) 
Nordhaus estimated that, in a steady state, the annual net cost of a rescission would 
equal $2.4 billion, assuming that all cars would otherwise be equipped with automatic- 
belt systems. He derived this number using NHTSA and manufacturer data which he 
believed to be biased against the belt system; hence he viewed his estimate as a lower 
bound on the net benefits of passive belts. Under these conservative assumptions, the 
benefits of the system ($3.6 billion) are three times greater than the costs ($1.2 billion}. 
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Nordhaus estimated the total discounted net social benefits of the passive-restraint rule 
at $33 billion. Alternatively, $33 billion represents the net cost to society of a complete 
rescission of the rule. Under the assumptions that he believed to be more reasonable, 
this figure rises to $69 billion. Nordhaus summarized his finding as follows: 
The passive restraint rule is, from an economic point of view, as important as any 
environmental, health, or safety rule on the books. If the estimates of the impact on 
fatalities are accurate, a rescission would be equivalent to repealing a law that cuts in 
half the homicide rate. It is equivalent to foregoing the medical advances that allowed 
the virtual elimination of death from tuberculosis over the last quarter century. 
Nordhaus’s CBA shares with Arnould and Grabowski’s an effective use of sensitivity 
analysis. Unlike Arnould and Grabowski, Nordhaus found that a world of air bags would 
be preferable to a world of passive belts. Despite the then-high cost estimate he used to 
evaluate bags ($425), Nordhaus concluded that an all-bag system would generate total 
discounted net social benefits of $47 billion. He did not dwell on the comparison, however, 
since at the time of his study belts appeared to be the wave of a 208 future. 
As part of his policy analysis, Nordhaus examined the impact on the automobile 
manufacturers of implementing Rule 208. The only major organized opposition to im- 
plementation of the Rule through the years, the manufacturers have expressed concern 
about the costs of adding passive restraints as standard equipment and what this would 
do to the demand for their product. The potential problem was of particular concern in 
the early 198Os, with the domestic industry in a depressed condition. Nordhaus presented 
a case that adverse effects would be minimal. He suggested that it is even conceivable 
that the industry would benefit from implementation of Rule 208. This would occur if 
consumers recognized the net economic savings involved in buying a passive-restraint- 
equipped car, given an associated reduction in automobile insurance costs. 
Graham, Henrion and Morgan [1981] have identified half a dozen other CBAs on 
the occupant-restraint issue and have produced a detailed analysis of their own, one which 
compares passive-restraint systems with other methods of encouraging restraint. Their 
analysis ranked FMVSS 208 below other alternatives in terms of both net benefits and 
benefit-cost ratio, with a compulsory belt-usage law having the highest ratio (in large 
part because its measurable costs are so low) and a combined air bag/mandatory-belt- 
usage law producing the greatest net benefits (and saving the most lives). All of the 
alternatives they examined produce positive net benefits; that is, each is preferable to 
the complete absence of occupant restraints (and superior to the current system of merely 
requiring belts in cars). In particular, they estimated that the benefits of FMVSS 208 
would exceed the costs by 95 percent. 
While the vast majority of occupant restraint CBAs conclude that restraint systems 
and rules are economically desirable, all of the precise estimates are highly dependent 
on assumptions concerning restraint system usage, effectiveness when used, and the value 
attributed to the saving of lives [Graham and Henrion, 19841. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE OCCUPANT RESTRAINT CBAS 
The CBAs noted above and others constitute a body of economic evidence on the 
social desirability of the government’s mandating use of seatbelts or the installation of 
passive restraints in all automobiles. These studies exhibit both significant consistencies 
and important differences. Among the latter are the following: some adopt a human- 
capital approach to valuing life (or livelihood), while others use willingness-to-pay [Warner 
and Lute, 19821; basic data sources, and hence magnitudes, often vary significantly; 
restraint alternatives differ from one analysis to the next; some analyses incorporate 
concerns like the effect of restraint systems on insurance costs, while others ignore them; 
and so on. 
Almost all of the studies can be faulted for their failure to treat analytically the 
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inconvenience and discomfort costs which, though nonpecuniary, seem to play a significant 
role in many people’s decisions about using manual belts. It may be difficult or unrea- 
sonable to place a dollar value on such costs directly. However, there are sensitivity 
analysis techniques that would permit an evaluation of the potential significance of these 
costs. For example, one might employ breakeven analysis to determine how highly people 
would have to value the inconvenience and discomfort in order to make passive belts 
appear to be socially undesirable [Warner and Lute, 19821. 
Despite their idiosyncrasies and their individual and collective flaws, as a body the 
passive-restraint CBAs (the emphasis of recent analysis) present an impressive case that 
society would benefit more than it would lose from a compulsory passive-restraint rule. 
The findings are reasonably consistent and robust. In general, the studies rank air bags 
ahead of passive belts as life-saving devices, in large part reflecting the ability (and desire) 
of many owners of passive-belt-equipped vehicles to disconnect their belts. With some 
notable exceptions, the analyses rank belts higher than bags on cost-effectiveness and 
cost-benefit grounds, primarily reflecting the much lower cost of the passive-belt option; 
but, as discussed above, these studies ignore the nonpecuniary costs of discomfort and 
the like. While all of the studies find passive belts to produce positive net benefits (again, 
absent nonmeasured psychological costs), several of the analyses note that the net benefit 
of air bags is sensitive to changes in assumptions. 
Despite the uniformity of these studies’ findings, the analyses have articulate critics 
who challenge basic assumptions of the models. Industry critics argue that seatbelt cost 
estimates used in the analyses are too low; and they focus in particular on estimates of 
passive-belt use. The automobile industry seems convinced that incremental belt-usage 
rates would be extremely low, assuming passive belts that could be easily disconnected 
(a condition that they believe would be demanded by the public). Thus the industry views 
passive belts as increasing vehicle costs without significantly increasing effective passenger 
restraint [Martin, 19811. Current (manual) belt users would thereby be “punished” by 
an unnecessary additional charge, while confirmed nonusers would have to bear the same 
additional burden but would realize no additional protection. 
At the close of this brief overview of occupant restraint CBAs, one should keep in 
mind several caveats. First, a finding that mandatory passive restraints of either type 
would be cost-beneficial does not necessarily mean that such a mandate would be the 
most cost-beneficial approach to saving lives through occupant restraint. Other alterna- 
tives should be compared, in order to seek the approach that would maximize net social 
benefits. The most obvious alternative in today’s legislative climate is mandatory belt use 
laws. Public education campaigns via the mass media and the schools constitute a second 
alternative. Combinations of efforts should also be considered (e.g. belt law plus mass 
media campaign). 
Second, use of the phrase “net social benefits” suggests an important aspect, and 
limitation, of using CBA in a policy framework: as was noted at the outset of this 
discussion, measurable costs and benefits are not the only, nor necessarily the most 
important. variables in policy decision-making. Above, studies were faulted for their 
failure to value discomfort and inconvenience; on the other hand, none of the CBAs 
attempts to quantify the pain and suffering of accident victims and their loved ones. Thus 
the net social benefit (including the noneconomic desire to minimize human suffering) 
may extend well beyond the measurable net economic benefit. We return to the impor- 
tance of this in the concluding section of the paper. 
Third and finally, CBAs generally do not adequately address the issue of just who 
benefits and who loses: not everyone realizes a net gain from implementation of a passive- 
restraint rule, and it is of course this division that has made a (slow) horse race out of 
what appears on cost-benefit grounds to be a socially desirable objective. CBAs typically 
examine total social benefits and costs, thus making distributional issues moot. But dis- 
tributional considerations often play central roles in policy debates and their resolution. 
Although it has been attempted only rarely, CBA can be adapted to incorporate political 
and distributional considerations [Luft, 19761. 
Public policy and automobile occupant restraint 45 
THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENTAL CONCERN WITH 
OCCUPANT RESTRAINT 
In traditional economic theory the grounds for governmental concern with an issue 
fall into one of two categories: technical problems with the operation of the free mar- 
ketplace (called market imperfections) and distributional and fairness problems (ineq- 
uity). The latter reflects society’s judgment that the efficiently functioning market pro- 
duces a distribution of a good or service that is socially unsatisfactory. Historically, for 
example, we have been unwilling to leave the distribution of educational opportunity 
exclusively to the unfettered marketplace; more recently, such goods and services as 
medical care, food and housing have been added to society’s list of “essentials” that 
should be made available, to some degree, to all of society’s members. 
Can governmental involvement in the occupant restraint issue be justified on equity 
grounds? Ex ante, it is difficult to imagine a reasonable equity argument, since the 
distribution of restraint is determined by individuals’ decisions made at very low cost 
(essentially the time and discomfort costs associated with buckling up, since belts are 
available in virtually all cars on the road today). One might argue that the ex post 
distribution of injuries is inequitable, largely because so many of the injuries are avoidable, 
but this seems to draw more heavily on a notion of paternalism than inequity in its 
traditional meaning. In short, the equity case for governmental involvement in occupant 
restraint, as it is commonly understood in economic theory, is not compelling. 
The more familiar justification for public intervention relies on the notion that the 
market has failed, in a technical sense, to produce the optimum utilization of restraint 
systems. Conventional sources of market failure (with common examples in parentheses) 
include the following: inadequately informed consumers (medical care), irrational eco- 
nomic behavior (drug addiction), too few buyers or sellers (hospital services), extreme 
economies of scale (public utilities), externalities (pollution) and the existence of a pure 
public good (national defense). 
Few markets present the ideal characteristics of the economic paradigm of efficient 
competition; market imperfections are identifiable to some degree in virtually all markets. 
The important question is one of degree: Is (are) the market imperfection(s) of sufficent 
importance to warrant interference with the workings of the free market? The pragmatic 
answer itself requires a comparison of costs and benefits: Do the benefits of the inter- 
vention(s) in question, in “righting” the market imperfection wrong, outweigh the costs 
of the intervention(s), including any inefficiencies associated with the process of inter- 
vening [Wolf, 1978]? 
The environment in which car occupants make restraint use decisions (the “market” 
here) exhibits elements of market imperfection in many areas. As noted above, people’s 
understanding of the risks of driving unrestrained is poor; on surveys, respondents sys- 
tematically underestimate their risk of having an automobile accident, while also under- 
estimating the effectiveness of belts. Furthermore, a natural inclination to avoid contem- 
plating disastrous fates may lead people to suppress concerns about driving safety, and 
therefore to behave irrationally with regard to restraint use. Evidence supporting the 
insensitivity-to-low-probabilities hypothesis provides an additional illustration of a knowl- 
edge and/or rationality problem. 
Flaws in the competitiveness of the automobile market also introduce relevant market 
imperfections. While there are several major automobile producers, their number and 
the market shares of the top firm, the top three, etc., are such that the idealized fruits of 
a perfectly competitive supply may not always be realized. For example, the absence of 
air bags as optional equipment on many cars may reflect in part the imperfect competi- 
tiveness of the market. Thus people who would be willing to pay for air bags do not always 
have the option available. This problem is exacerbated by the apparent economies of 
scale in air bag manufacture and installation. Auto producers claim that the per unit costs 
of bags would fall precipitously if the demand for bags were in the many hundreds of 
thousands. In 1980, for example, General Motors estimated that the average consumer 
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cost of an air bag would be $1100 if 100,000 were produced and that it would fall to $650 
to $700 if 400,000 were manufactured. Ford has estimated a 200 percent difference in 
per-unit manufacturer cost between producing 200,000 and 885,000 air bag-equipped cars 
[Warner, 19821. Thus the potential bag purchaser’s cost of acquiring this form of restraint 
system is highly dependent on whether a “critical mass” of car buyers is like-minded. 
The principal market imperfection argument raised in favor of governmental concern 
with occupant restraint is the externality argument. Accidents and resultant injuries im- 
pose an economic burden on people other than those involved in the accidents. This 
results from pervasive insurance coverage. The medical bills of accident victims are cov- 
ered predominantly by insurance (private and public insurance covers over 90 percent of 
hospital bills), so fellow policyholders and taxpayers bear the economic responsibility for 
caring for the victims of accidents. In the instance in which the victim was unrestrained, 
both the injury and its associated costs might have been avoided. 
A second form of externality is a technological one relating to air bags. The majority 
of MVA injury victims are not the original purchasers of the cars in which they are 
injured. Consequently the failure of the original owners to purchase air bags deprives 
the second-hand owner (or other user of the car) of the protection afforded by air bags 
[Baker, 19791. Since retrofitting a car to include a bag is today a very expensive propo- 
sition, second-hand owners could desire air bag protection at a price in excess of the 
original-equipment cost (depreciated) but less than the cost of retrofitting; i.e. they would 
rationally decide to drive without air bag protection while being willing to pay the de- 
preciated cost of original equipment. 
Externality arguments are appealed to most often, but some observers consider their 
use an instance of trying to rationalize something that the user desires for other reasons. 
In other words, it is not really the disseminated economic burden that causes people and 
their governments to advocate occupant restraint, though the federal and state govern- 
ments in particular are acutely aware of the economic dimension (due to responsibility 
for Medicare and Medicaid, respectively). Rather, it is something else, something less 
readily justified in an economically and politically conservative environment. Put simply, 
it is a concern with the aggregate death and disability burden of avoidable injuries, a 
conviction that such avoidable damage is, simple, socially untenable. This attitude likely 
arises from a number of sources, including general concern for the public health and 
welfare and compassion for known victims of accidents and hence the desire to help 
prevent others from realizing the same fate. 
At first blush, this motivation would seem to be divorced from economics. It is quite 
reasonable, however, to describe the motivation in economic terms, relying on the con- 
cepts of externality and public goods. Regarding the former, one can argue that both 
individual tragedies and the collective toll of automobile accident injuries impose an 
emotional burden on other members of society, not limited just to the family and friends 
of victims. For example, all of us suffer when we read in the paper about a 10 year-old 
child being thrown through a windshield and sentenced to a life as a quadraplegic. 
The public goods argument is similar in nature, if somewhat different in emphasis. 
Here the concern is with the aggregate toll of MVA injuries representing a “public bad,” 
and the sense that reducing the total would represent a public good, one that is not being 
achieved through individual decisions regarding use of restraints. 
In both instances-the externality and public goods arguments-one can understand 
the basic logic and still be left with a disquieting taste. At one level, it is difficult to be 
entirely rid of the flavor of paternalism, the sense that governmental insistance on car 
occupants being restrained results from the conclusion that occupants do not behave as 
they “should” (i.e. as a “reasonable adult” would) and hence that they must be forced 
to do so. In a country dedicated to individual liberty, this is not a satisfying reason for 
public sector involvement. Indeed, in this context, many Americans will read “involve- 
ment” as unwarranted “intrusion.” 
Where does this leave us? Are the market imperfections alluded to sufficient to 
recommend governmental concern with occupant restraint, or is such concern simply an 
instance of well-intentioned Big Brotherism? This is both a conceptual and an empirical 
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question. The empirical question is addressed by analysis such as the CBAs discussed 
above: Do the benefits of a particular governmental intervention (such as mandating 
passive restraints in all new cars) outweigh the costs? In the next section we examine this 
question further. At the conceptual level, the economic theory c;ase for governmental 
concern with occupant restraint rests on the multiplicity of individually relatively minor 
market imperfections. That is, no imperfection by itself presents an overwhelmingly 
compelling case for governmental involvement, but the sheer number of deviations from 
the characteristics of an ideally f~ctioning market presents a case that must be considered 
it least arguable. At its core, however: it may well be that the best ease for governmental 
involvement resides in a kind of public-Good notion that lies somewhat outside the domain 
of neoclassical economic theory, an appeal to the good of the ~ornrn~~~~y as being some- 
thing greater than the sum of its individual parts [Beauchamp, 1984], 
THE FORM OF: GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION 
Public sector involvement in the marketplace can take any number of forms, ranging 
from the simple provision of information to the production and distribution of a good or 
service. Economic theory can inform the debate on the optimal type of intervention, as 
well as the desirability of its fact. A review of the market impe~~ctions discussed in the 
preceding sectiun su~ests some guidelines a~pr~~r~~t~ to the occupant restraint case. 
First and foremost, the apparent existence of a s~~tantial information deficit on the part 
of the public, likely mixed with a limited ability to contemplate the need for restraint in 
a wholly rational manner, emphasizes that government should be striving to educate the 
public on the need for and benefits of occupant restraint. This approach to a public health 
problem has a long and honorable tradition, ranging from traditional school health ed- 
ucation to mass media campaigns to encourage smoking prevention and cessation. In the 
area of occupant restraint, government sponsored media campaigns have been undertaken 
and were long ago identified as the Reagan Administration’s preferred approach. Eval- 
uations of such campaigns, however, have not found that they produced signficant be- 
havior change [Robertson, Kelley, @Neil1 d ai. ~ 1974; Robertson, 19833. Advocates have 
responded that previous campaigns have not been well designed, a response that pro- 
ponents of a passive restraint rule consider a stalling tactic. Thus concept and pra~atics 
meet iss an uncomfo~able arena: theory calls for provision of i~f~rrnatio~~ but experience 
challenges the effectiveness of this strategy. 
No tactic need be pursued in isolation. It is certainly conceivable that a well-designed 
information campaign might play an integral role in a governmental effort that also 
included more “aggressive” tactics. The collectivity of market imperfections identified in 
the preceding section seems to recommend that government use a carrot or stick to 
encourage the automobile marmfacturers to move in the direction of installation of more 
passive restraints. The Administration’s current proposal presents an interesting mix of 
earrot and stick in requiring the installation of passive restraints but providing an “out” 
if enough state legislatures can be encouraged to pass mandatory seatbelt use laws, Other 
tactics could include tax-system-based ecunomic incentives to producers or consumers, 
SW% as tax credits for, respectively, producing or buying passive restraint equipped cars. 
Alter~atively~ encoura~emeut or incentives could be directed at the insurance industry 
to develop rate structures that incorporate discounts for equipped cars (as is currently 
done by a few insurance companies) [Kunreuther, 19851. 
AUTOMOBILE OCCUPANT RESTRAINT: ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
PRACTICE-FINAL THOUGHTS 
The theory of public sector economics and the practice of cost-benefit analysis in 
the area of automobile occupant restraint raise an ~big~o~s and somewhat anomalous 
situation: it is impossible to assess whether they are consistent or inconsistent; as a result, 
it is impossible to conclude with certainty that go~~ernme~tal i~t~rv~~tio~ in the occupant 
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restraint matter is desirable (or not), at least as economic logic would define desirability. 
The problem is the foilowi~~g: consistency requires that a finding af positive net benefits 
in a CBA of a public sector initiative be associated with an intervention that is clearly 
justified on grounds of market failure. The reason for this is that a perfectly functioning 
free market ought to arrive at results that produce available net benefits. If net benefits 
can be attained by deviating from a market result, something must be imperfect in that 
market. Together, the theoretical and empirical evidence might therefore seem to support 
the appropriateness of governmental involvement in the restraint issue. But the matter 
is not quite this simple, because our review of conceptual considerations left us with an 
ambiguous reading of the theoretical justification of intervention, and the CBAs are 
flawed by what they do not (and perhaps cannot) measure--the time and especially 
~ychological cc&s of buckling up for many occupants and the v&e of the pain and 
suffering associated with avoidable injuries. Inclusion of the latter in CBAs certainly 
would add to the apparent desirability of governmental encouragement of restraint use; 
inclusion of the former, however, would detract from it. 
This last point raises an essential conclusion noted earlier that warrants reiteration 
here: people choose not to wear existing (active) seatbelts for a number of reasons, only 
some of which may represent true market failure (e.g. misinformation or understanding 
about the effectiveness of belts or the risk of injury). The others-inconvenience and 
the physical or psychological discomfort experienced by some-constitute very real costs 
of belt-wearing. Arnould and Grabowski acknowedged such costs but dismissed them as 
incapable of explaining the high rate of nonutiIization of belts. A consideration of their 
benefit-cost calculus, however, suggests that discomfort costs, combined with time and 
inconvenience costs, can go a long way toward explaining much nonntili~ation. In the 
face of the authors’ finding of positive net benefits to individual belt use, the fact that 
the vast majority of the public does not buckle up implies either the existence of a 
significant market imperfection (presumably relating to lack of knowledge or irrationality) 
or an incorrect cost-benefit calculation, most likely due to omission of some important 
cost(s) of wearing belts, 
Economists’ inability to measure and value nonpecuniary costs is reflected in a second 
form of omission in occupant restraint CBA: no major CBA has assessed the desirability 
of a restraint alternative that is center stage in the occupant restraint debate-a rnandat~r~~ 
manual belt-use law ~tb~~gh Graham, Henrion and Norman [1981] considered this option 
briefly). This omission is not an unmeditated chance hap~~ing. Rather, it represents a 
premeditated decision to avoid trying to apply CBA to a case in which the principal costs 
are not readily measurable and convertible into dollars and cents. This is ciearly of 
consequence to the occupant restraint debate, since a major approach is being ignored 
in the formal analysis, And it represents a generalizable limitation, and lesson, of the 
application of formal CBA: the understandable inclination to study analytically manage- 
able policy alternatives means that analytically “messy” but legitimate alternatives are at 
risk of being overlooked or downplayed. The same analytical factor translates into the 
dimunition of ethical and philosophical considerations. In the present instance, the QV- 
erriding issue for many ~iti~el~s-paternalism, the specter of Big Brother-has been 
ignored in the formal quantitative policy analyses. 
Where does this leave us? An economic conservative would conclude, I believe, that 
there is a case for governmental involvement in the form of provision of information, 
perhaps through a number of educational efforts. The case for more aggressive inter- 
vention might be deemed more equivocal, at best. The public health professional (or the 
economic liberal), by contrast, could read the economic evidence as supporting inter- 
vention in the form of regulation. The formal CBAs do present a compelling case that 
the measurable benefits of a passive restraint rule (and likely a mandatory belt use law*) 
*The readily measurable components af a mandatory belt use law are the benefits which, given similar 
use rates, would be comparably to those of passive b&s. Measurable costs of use laws, by contrast, are small, 
barring an elaborate enforcement effort. 
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outweigh measurable costs. combined with an appeal to the notion of community in- 
terest-our collective social benefit from making a substantial dent in the highway death 
and disability toll-this analytical evidence constitutes a plausible case for the public 
sector role in occupant restraint. 
The economic perspective offers one final essential insight that deserves emphasis 
for a group of health pr~f~ssi~~als concerned with injury prevention. The prevention of 
injuries is an economic activity which, like any other, demands resources that have 
valuable and valid alternative uses. As such, injury avoidance shouid be thought of in a 
cost-benefit framework, whether or not the formal analytics are actually carried out, 
Achieving reductions in the toll of injuries implies giving up something else-for example, 
giving up public health professio~ais’ devotion of their time to encouraging a healthy 
diet. Thus, injury prevention should be sought onfy so long as the benefits of additional 
avoidance of injuries exceed the additio~a~ (or marginal) costs. In our a&too-real world, 
this means that the optimum levei of injuries is most likely non-zero; that is, sensible 
social policy includes the notion of knowing when to stop seeking further gains in injury 
avoidance. In the present instance, the existence of many thousands of easily avoided 
MVA injuries suggests that the optimum level of injury prevention has yet to be attained. 
Perhaps the most important lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that 
economic analysis exists in an environment in which compIex social forces and concepts 
hold equal or greater sway. A technicai weakness of the restraint CBAs is their inability 
to account adequately for costs and benefits that are at their core hard to quantify or 
monetize, An “environmental” weakness of CBA is that, even when technical@ perfect, 
it must yield to the often inexplicable vagaries of politics and social decision making. 
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